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1In recent years, there has been a lively
debate in the social sciences on the role of
groups or “communities” in economic devel-
opment and growth (North 1990). The
debate stems from the classical notions, from
European sociology, of Gemeinschaft and
“mechanical solidarity” (Tönnies 1957
[1887]; Weber 1921; Durkheim 1984
[1893]). The contemporary terminology
for these debates includes labels like social
capital (Coleman 1990; Putnam 2000;
Putnam, with Leonardi and Nanetti 1993;
Fukuyama 1999) and civil society (Pérez
Díaz 1993; Douglass and Friedmann 1998).
Communities refers variously to features of
group life, such as norms, traditions and
social conventions, interpersonal contacts,
relationships, and informal networks.
Although there are many dimensions of
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community, the analytical core of the
concept for our purposes is that access to
membership in communities that are
nontrivial (in the sense that they are capable
of sustained collective action) is costly,
cognitively complex (requiring a lot of
“local” and complex information), and
hence subject to high and “personalized”
entry barriers. At the same time, member-
ship confers coordination advantages with
other members at a low cost. Communities
have specific types of enforcement mech-
anisms, which are both ex ante and ex post,
but also involve interpersonal “positional”
sanctions for an individual.
Society, by contrast, generally refers to
institutions that are defined by more trans-
parent and codified rules. Although these
rules may also be costly to learn, they are
not transmitted principally through
informal and interpersonal means, but
instead operate under conditions of
anonymity.  Coordination with other
members tends to be at a higher initial cost
than does coordination within communi-
ties and involves formal and costly ex post
enforcement mechanisms, in which sanc-
tions are individual in nature.1
We tend to think of society as having a
greater spatial extent than community, but
upon closer inspection, this is not neces-
sarily true. The Catalan “community” is
bigger than the Danish “society.” Moreover,
“Danishness” is both communitarian and
societal in its operational reality. Spatial
extent tends to be most clearly differenti-
ated at the empirical extremes of our
conceptual continuum—neighborhood civic
groups (a small spatial extent) versus
“United States” (a large territorial extent).
This points out that an inquiry into the rela-
tionships between society and community
may, under some circumstances, be about
local versus regional, national, or global,
but it is not so as a matter of theoretical
necessity. Rather, its interest to economic
geographers and others who study territo-
rial development is that—at whatever terri-
torial scale the relations between society
and community play out—they do play out
at some territorial scale. Society and
community are territorially differentiated,
albeit at a potentially large variety of
different scales, depending on the concrete
problem to which we apply them as analyt-
ical categories. Hence, the inquiry into
society and community is inherently
about the territorial patterning and differ-
entiation of economic development.
We argue that these two ways of binding
people together correspond to two funda-
mentally different—but mutually necessary
and complementary—types of relationships
between individuals and collective action
in the economy. In the real world, they then
shape one another, and it is precisely this
mutual influence in constructing complex
institutional realities that is the subject of
this article.
For students of economic develop-
ment, the question is why certain institu-
tional arrangements of community and
society facilitate the economic process while
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1 Society and community are increasingly oper-
ationalized in the scholarly literature. The oper-
ationalization of society attracts more of a
consensus than does that of community. Society
is generally operationalized using such indicators
as the rule of law, property rights and other
market-shaping rules, the stability of constitu-
tional or regime rules, the type of legal system
and its everyday operational institutions, the
nature of bureaucracy and its rule-boundedness,
and so on. Many different data sets are used by
scholars who operationalize what we are labeling
“societal” forces. Community is more complicated
to operationalize. On the one hand, there are indi-
cators that measure the degree of bondedness,
usually concentrating on the density, extent,
and depth of membership in civic, economic,
social, and professional associations. The objec-
tive is to capture group life. On the other hand,
there are indicators of division, such as ethnic,
racial, or other forms of fragmentation, which are
assumed to be the “flip side” of bonds within
those groups. In addition to these objective indi-
cators, subjective feelings of membership, affinity,
bonding, and so forth are also measured. The
literature on social capital has attempted
various combinations of these types of indicators,
as has an older sociological literature on commu-
nity itself (see Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004).
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others seem to hinder it. This considera-
tion of group life is part of a more general
turn toward examining the role of institu-
tions and underlying social forces in
economic development. It has been stim-
ulated by increasing evidence that tradi-
tional growth theories, based on physical
and human resource endowments, trade,
technology transfers, or governmental
structure, cannot adequately explain devel-
opment, as reflected in the stubbornly high
residuals in growth regressions (Solow
1994).
Granovetter (1985) and Coleman (1990)
pioneered concepts—such as “embed-
dedness” and social capital—that empha-
size the potentially beneficial effects of
group life on economic development.2 The
prevailing view among geographers and
sociologists and, to a much lesser extent,
among economists, is that the development
of the institutions of community—some-
times coupled with the use of temporary
organizations, such as development coali-
tions (Asheim 2002)—improves the provi-
sion of public goods (Coleman 1990; North
1990) and market organization (Granovetter
1985) through the embedding of firms in
efficiency-enhancing networks of rela-
tionships (Grabher 1993). Communities are
said to have such beneficial effects by
generating trust (Fukuyama 1999; Putnam
2000; Bowles and Gintis 2002), reducing
transaction costs between economic agents
(Storper 1997), limiting moral hazards—or
the risk of opportunistic behavior by raising
the costs or lowering the benefits for the
group—and free riding (Streeck 1992;
Putnam 2000), mitigating asymmetries in
information (Granovetter 1985; Wade
1987), and enabling the matching of indi-
vidual to aggregate interests (Rodríguez-
Pose 1999). Thus, community is said to
provide an “institutional exoskeleton” for
behavior that is conducive to develop-
ment (Streeck 1991).3
A positive relationship between commu-
nity and economic performance has been
strongly suggested by numerous qualitative
case studies of industrial districts and clus-
ters (Piore and Sabel 1984; Kristensen 1992;
Semlinger 1993; Burroni 2001; Becattini and
Sforzi 2002; Bellandi 2002), “learning
regions” (Morgan 1997; Gertler, Wolfe, and
Garkut 2000; Henry and Pinch 2000; Bathelt
2001), and regional systems of innovation
(Cooke and Morgan 1998). Many quantita-
tive analyses have reached similar results.
For example, the pioneering statistical
analysis of Putnam et al. (1993) showed that
differences in levels of community institu-
tions between northern and southern Italy
were at the base of their sizable income
inequalities. Later research has found that
proxies of community, such as group partic-
ipation, are correlated with better economic
performance (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak
and Knack 2001; Beugelsdijk, de Groot, and
van Schaik 2004; Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales 2004), or that, conversely, deep divi-
sions between groups limit an economy’s
overall potential for growth (Easterly and
Levine 1997; Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi
2004).
Yet the claim that community facilitates
economic performance has also been
strongly challenged in empirical research.
Drawing on the classical work of Banfield
(1958) on southern Italy, Trigilia (1992)
showed that the lack of institutional density
was not at the root of the Mezzogiorno’s
chronic development problems, but rather
the negative externalities associated with the
prevalence of “primitive” forms of commu-
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2 Granovetter, building on his notion of the
“weakness of strong ties,” also held that commu-
nities can be damaging to prospects for economic
development under some conditions, calling
attention to the possibility of excessive embed-
dedness. We discuss the disadvantages of commu-
nity later in this article and how institutional forms
can check and balance strong communities.
3 Along the same lines, “institutional thickness”
is seen as a favorable condition for economic
development (Amin and Thrift 1995). The greater
the density of community institutions within a
given territory, the greater the potential for higher
economic growth and development (Amin and
Thomas 1996; Morgan 1997; Cooke and Morgan
1998).
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nity. The dominance of such groups leads to
pervasive rent seeking (or the determination
of certain individuals to seek benefits at
the expense of all others in the community),
insider-outsider problems (or the pernicious
conflicts of interest between insiders to a
community and outsiders), clientelism, and
nepotistic practices. All of these factors have
negative effects on overall development and
on the distribution of income. Rodríguez-
Pose (2001) and Martin and Sunley (2003)
argued that there is relatively little evidence
to support the notion of the superior
economic performance of closely knit clus-
ters and communities.
There is also theoretical uneasiness with
the claim that communities generate posi-
tive externalities. As North (1990) and
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) argued,
community may merely be a second-best
solution to economic coordination when reli-
able formal institutions to address market
failures and protect property rights are
underdeveloped. From this perspective,
even when societal rules are well developed,
strong communities may lead to greater
social polarization by hampering equal
opportunity and may exacerbate problems
of imperfect competition, impacted infor-
mation (or the cost of unequal information
across parties to a contract), and principal-
agent problems4 (Durlauf 1999; Durlauf and
Fafchamps 2004). In concert with this skep-
ticism about groups or communities, the
contemporary consensus in economics and
political science is that societal institutions
that are based on transparent rules—such
as property rights and the rule of law—are
universally good for economic development
because they promote individual choice
(preference realization) and factor mobility
(adjustment) (Schleifer 2002).
It has frequently been considered that,
under some circumstances, such societal
institutions may also have detrimental effects
on development. For example, sometimes
low levels of interpersonal confidence—
which may be due to the weakness of
group life, itself abetted by some societal
institutions—cannot be compensated by
societal rules and laws in ensuring against
opportunistic defection from contracts
(Streeck 1991); hence, low levels of commu-
nity could potentially leave the door open to
a confrontational society that is character-
ized by high transaction costs and costly
conflict resolution (Storper 2005). A society
with weak groups would also likely suffer
from the inadequate production of public
goods in the fields of education and training,
environmental management, or technolog-
ical innovation because the pursuit of strictly
individual maximization strategies would
lead to attempts at self-provision by a limited
number of people. But positive scale
economies would not be attained, and nega-
tive externalities would be generated; by
contrast, widespread group organization
widens the constituencies for such goods and
reduces these problems. In labor markets,
it has been shown that the less skilled
depend more on networks and groups than
do the highly skilled to secure them a
proportionate return to their skills; it follows
that societal institutions alone may promote
long-term increases in inequality, which,
beyond a certain level, can discourage effort
and lead to overall productivity losses for the
economy (Aghion 1998; Sen 2002).
Thus, the debate over the relationship
among community, society, and economic
development remains sharply polarized. If
for some, communities generate positive
externalities that assist economic activity, for
others, communitarian bonds are second
best to the formal institutions of society
(Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004), and for still
others who work in contemporary institu-
tionalist theory, groups are generally bad for
long-term development because of the
pervasive agency problems that they
generate (Buchanan and Tullock 1962;
Olson 1965; North 1981).
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4 Principal-agent problems arise when an indi-
vidual or organization has to rely on another party,
the agent, to perform an action or a service on
her behalf and is unable to verify or evaluate
the agent’s actions, thus creating the opportunity
for the agent to pursue his own interest at the
expense of the principal’s interest.
VOL. 82 NO. 1 BETTER RULES OR STRONGER COMMUNITIES? 5
This debate, however rich and insightful,
remains incomplete. As we have argued
elsewhere (Storper 2005), it has focused
almost entirely on the tradeoffs between
society and community, seeing them as
inherently mutually opposed forms of insti-
tutional coordination. It has rarely consid-
ered their interactions. All real economies,
however, operate in a context that consists
not only of individuals and society, but of
groups as well. Individuals bond together
into groups, and societal rules then enable
these groups to interact—or bridge—more
or less successfully. Missing from the
standard debate is that under certain
circumstances, both society and commu-
nity can possess qualities that can offset the
potentially negative qualities of the other.
Community can lower transactions costs
and raise interpersonal confidence, while
society can ensure competition and hence
minimize rent seeking, free riding, and scle-
rosis. By contrast, the relative scarcity of
either society or community can result in
misaligned incentives and agency problems,
which can ultimately have negative effects
on the quality and quantity of long-term
economic development (Table 1). Hence,
society and community can be comple-
ments in potentiating economic develop-
ment, not simply contradictory forces, as is
claimed in much of the literature.
This polarization is evident as well in the
analysis of changes in group life or soci-
etal rules, which is the standard fare of insti-
tutionalist social science. Changes are
considered in isolation from one another.
Does a move toward stronger groups
favor economic performance? Or is it the
other way around? The answer to this ques-
tion about the potential effect of “stronger
rules” on economic development can, in
our view, be discovered only by considering
what simultaneously occurs to the strength
of groups or communities in the economy
because it determines how such rules are
actually used. By the same token, the effects
of the increasing or decreasing strength of
groups can be ascertained only by consid-
ering the context of their societal rules.
Toward this end, this article provides a
framework for understanding the changes
in the interaction of the two that affect
medium-term economic performance.
Institutions are at the heart of a number
of other literatures whose concern is
comparative economic development,
including “varieties of capitalism,” national
business systems, and national innovation
systems (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1992;
Christopherson 2002; Hall and Soskice
2002). They focus, variously, on labor
market laws and the relationships among
business, government, research and devel-
opment (R&D), and unions; relationships
among banking, capital markets, and corpo-
rate governance; and relationships among
R&D, education, entrepreneurship, and
workplace dynamics and cultures. Although
the mix of factors considered is different
from one approach to another, all try to find
different but internally coherent institu-
tional architectures (at the national or
regional level) and to link them to differ-
ences in economic performance, such as
growth, specialization, innovation, and
corporate form. Although in all these
literatures, occasional references can be
found to such microdimensions of behavior
as “trust” or its lack, cultures, and some-
times to the effects of “small” rules on the
behavior of individual agents, for the most
part, they are mesolevel theories, which
seek effects of history in defining institu-
tions that, in turn, define collective action
and pathways of economic adjustment
and problem solving (or lock-in). They tend
to use descriptive or typological compar-
isons; as such, the comparisons ultimately
are limited by the ability to strip away some
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Table 1
The Economic Outcomes of the
Interaction Between Community and
Society
Society Community
Low High
High Suboptimal Optimal
Low Worst-case scenario Suboptimal
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of their complexity and determine whether
institutions that appear different are somehow
similar in some deeper underlying way. Many
development economists are starting to do
just this: they argue that there are many func-
tionally equivalent but different ways to ensure
that markets work properly, so we need to
compare them not on the basis of whether the
instruments are precisely identical, but on
whether the incentives and outcomes that they
generate are similar. This is what we propose
in this article for institutions and institu-
tional change: society and community are
concepts that seek to describe not all the
complexity of how institutions appear, but
what gives them underlying structure in terms
of the kinds of incentives for action that they
generate and how these incentives change.
These underlying forces can take many
different concrete observable forms.
We begin by considering the external and
internal sources of change in society and
community as the underlying sources of
changing interactions between them (second
section). We then develop a descriptive model
of possible trajectories of change in the overall
balance of society and community (second
section). Next, we consider the process of
change in greater detail, distinguishing those
starting points that offer the possibility of rapid
(positive or negative) change from those whose
existing institutional structures are likely to
produce only slow or gradual change (third
section). Finally, we reexamine these change
processes in light of the specific behaviors that
are often considered in the wider institu-
tionalist literature—such as agency, free riding,
and rent seeking—arguing that an increase or
decrease in these behaviors is conditioned
by society-community interactions (fourth
section). At the end, we return to resituate
what we have done in relationship to the wider
field of institutionalist social science and
economic geography.
Society and Community in
Interaction
Before we can consider change, we need
to see more generally how society-community
interactions shape the institutional founda-
tions of economic development. Groups and
rules interact to shape the basic ways that indi-
viduals can participate in the economy,
creating incentives for them to do some things
and not to do others.5 What are these incen-
tives? The first column of Table 2 lists three
main areas in which certain first-order
conditions for economic growth must be satis-
fied: those that ensure microeconomic effi-
ciency, those that define the social policy
underpinnings of such efficiency, and those
that encourage effective problem solving. In
other words, these are basic underlying condi-
tions that have been identified as necessary to
successful economic development, but—as
was noted earlier—they take many different
functionally equivalent institutional forms
(Rodrik 2003).6
To take the first such feature, any set of
forces that systematically reduces transac-
tion costs and moral hazards creates a
microeconomic environment that comes
across to individual actors as a reason to
have confidence in the economic process. The
economic consequences are both static and
dynamic. On the static side, improving the
efficiency of economic transactions raises
output, but what is more important, on the
dynamic side, it encourages growth by stim-
ulating the further development of the
economy-wide division of labor (Young 1928;
Stigler 1951). The reduction of moral hazards
allows us to estimate better future rewards,
which, in turn, are reflected in discount rates,
perceptions of risk,7 and positively affecting
expectations and effort levels. Both encourage
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5 The remainder of this section is a synthesis
of a more detailed argument that may be found
in Storper (2005).
6 There is, of course, a fourth area, macroeco-
nomics, but that area is beyond the scope of
this article.
7 We are reminded here of the fundamental
distinction between risk and uncertainty, intro-
duced by Frank Knight (1921). When confidence
is weak or absent, the problem is that risks can
no longer be estimated and hence minimized,
and actors must face true uncertainty, with
strongly negative effects on many of the foun-
dations of long-term growth.
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entrepreneurship, particularly the innova-
tive “Schumpeterian” brand (Kirzner 1973;
Swedberg 1991; Casson 1995). In addition,
confidence encourages governments to be
less myopic in their policies, and myopic
governmental policies have been shown to
be harmful to growth (Persson and Tabellini
2002).
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Table 2
Society-Community Interactions and Incentives 
Incentives Necessary
for Long-Term
Development
Microeconomic:
Confidence
↓
Social Policy:
Effective and accept-
able distributional
trade-offs
↓↓
Problem Solving: 
Successful ongoing
conflict resolution
Note:→ ↓: cumulative and/or one-way causal effect; →←:  two-way interactions and feedbacks.
Principal
Microeconomic
Effects of Each
Incentive
• Reduces transac-
tions costs
• Reduces moral
hazards
• Raises expecta-
tions and efforts
↓
• Precedent encour-
ages ongoing
“sacrifices” in face
of shocks (Rodrik
1999)
• Overcomes disin-
centive to partici-
pate and make
effort (Aghion
1998)
↓↓
• Participation of
groups is
enhanced
• Minimize rent
seeking from
corporatism
Operational
Institutions:
Behavior, Routines,
Regularities
• E n c o u r a g e s
Schumpeterian
entrepreneur
• Improves the
coordination of
firm-firm transac-
tions
• Raises investment
levels
↓ →
• Raises invest-
ments in skills
• Raises work and
entrepreneurial
participation rates
• Improves the will-
ingness to pay
taxes (investment)
↓↓
→
• Better adjustment
of rules governing
entrepreneurship
and labor markets   
• Intelligent ideas
are more likely to
receive support as
public policy
• Coalitions can
form, avoiding
chaotic instability
→
Role of
Communitarian
“Bonding” in
Bringing About
Each Incentive
• R e p u t a t i o n a l
effects, shared
conventions, iden-
tities (depends on
the process of
group formation)
• O v e r c o m e s
certain informa-
tion problems in a
low-cost way (but
can encourage
rent seeking)
→
• Voice and loyalty
• Being in the same
boat enhances
acceptability
• Membership may
involve real forms
of intragroup
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n
→
• Secure groups
encourage coali-
tion formation:
voice that gets
heard (but risk of
principal-agent
problems)
→
Role of Societal
“Bridging” in
Bringing About
Each Incentive
• Overarching rules
promote trans-
parency and limit
rent seeking, help
to complete
markets
←
• C o u n t e r a c t s
corporatism and
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l
holdups
• Standards of fair-
ness and effi-
ciency constrain
group demands
• I n t e r g r o u p
mobility (exit),
disciplines groups
←
• Limits to group
power encourage
compromise
• Exit options,
defection, make
other coalitions
possible, hence
dynamically limit
principal-agent
problems
←
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Confidence is also directly related to
the central mechanism of contemporary
growth theory, which is the development
and application of knowledge (Romer 1986,
1987, 1990; Lucas 1988; Grossman and
Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1992;
Jones 2004). Knowledge is different from
other factors of production, in that it can
have endlessly increasing returns because
knowledge is nonrivalrous; hence it can be
reused at no additional cost, applied in many
different ways, and recombined into
different uses. Communities facilitate these
processes of knowledge sharing by
promoting selective affinities among
economic agents (Easterly 2001). At the
same time, if knowledge stays too much
inside such bounded communities—when
communities mistrust each other—then
knowledge will have a limited and uneven
spread. Bridging between communities
gives the more knowledgeable communi-
ties confidence that their knowledge will be
used by members of other communities to
their mutual benefit.
The second feature of successful devel-
opment is an effective social policy envi-
ronment, as reflected in distributional
arrangements, which include both the distri-
bution of income and the processes
(markets, rules, and groups) by which
incomes are determined. Such arrangements
have an important dynamic effect. The
analysis of development transitions has
shown that acceptable distributional arrange-
ments help economies to adjust successfully
to the inevitable shocks and setbacks of the
development process because they
encourage compromise and sacrifice (Rodrik
1999).
Standard models of the factor prices, and
thus the distribution of income, call atten-
tion to the incentive effects of appropriate
prices. Empirically, this means that some
degree of income inequality corresponds
to an equilibrium level. A long tradition of
reflection, mostly from outside economics,
suggests that there can be social costs or
externalities from inequalities, even in equi-
librium. Within economics, recent models
have shown that some levels of inequality
are not equilibria. Too much inequality
simply leads to the withdrawal of effort by
potentially productive actors; formally, it
amounts to a capital market imperfection
(Aghion 1998).8 Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
and Persson and Tabellini (2002) argued
theoretically that less inequality has a posi-
tive relationship to growth, which is consis-
tent with the empirical evidence that
shows that the highly performing Asian
economies have all been characterized by
limited inequality, in contrast to the poorly
performing Latin American economies.
Appropriate distributional arrangements
encourage participation and discourage
the withdrawal of effort—whether between
or within groups. One way in which they
do so is by providing incentives for those
who are not the greatest beneficiaries of new
technologies to support (or, at least, not
block) innovations, which are generally most
strongly pushed by those who stand to
benefit the most from them (Mokyr 1990).
Moderation in inequality improves overall
investments in the creation of skill, raises
the incentives to participate fully in the
formal economy and to become an entre-
preneur (hence, participation rates and
levels), and improves the willingness to pay
taxes and to invest.
Thorstein Veblen and other precursors of
evolutionary thinking in economics gave us
the basic notion that an economy’s institu-
tions would allow the economy (if successful)
to select itself in an ongoing way into the
things it could do well and hence to sustain
the development process over time
(Hodgson 2004). In such a dynamic process,
no institutional arrangements resolve all
problems for good: what are good institu-
tional forms at one stage are no longer appro-
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8 These models have an indirect link to Sen’s
(1999) notion that extreme inequality expresses
the lack of, but also impedes the construction of,
the social bonds that are crucial to development
because it discourages the provision of certain
necessary social goods and deprives the poorest
of the preconditions (basic resources) that would
enable them to contribute to their own, and soci-
ety’s, development.
VOL. 82 NO. 1 BETTER RULES OR STRONGER COMMUNITIES? 9
priate at others (Bremer and Kasarda 2002).9
Ongoing problem-solving adjustment of the
rules governing investment, entrepreneur-
ship, and the regulation of labor markets
becomes necessary as an economy under-
goes structural change. Communities,
regions, and nations “like companies, need
to innovate and adapt to remain competi-
tive” (Gertler and Wolfe 2004, 46). This is
one of the biggest differences between coun-
tries that succeeded in the second half of the
twentieth century and those that stagnated
(e.g., East Asia versus sub-Saharan Africa),
but also between countries that initially did
well (as in Latin America) but subse-
quently did not continue to move up the
world distribution of income. In the East
Asian cases, for example, institutions were
adjusted to limit rent seeking as the poten-
tial rents from development increased, thus
continuing to expose domestic firms to
internal and international competition and
generating a steady catch-up with the factor
productivity of the developed countries.
By contrast, in Latin America, labor produc-
tivity is at the same level or lower as a
percentage of the developed countries as it
was in 1950, even after adjustments for
human capital levels. Elites have preferred
policies that are oriented to rent earning (in
both the productive and financial sectors),
and income distributions became more
unequal through rent accrual at the top
(Cole, Ohanian, Riascos, and Schmitz 2004).
Thus, the lack of problem solving was, in
turn, linked to unsatisfactory distributional
arrangements, which, in turn, has generated
stagnation, instability, and insufficient confi-
dence for more than half a century in most
of Latin America.
These three broad features and their
associated economic behaviors characterize
a wide variety of successful long-term
economic development experiences. By
contrast, cases of stagnation or long-term
developmental regress manifest failure to
achieve these features and to enjoy the
microeconomic and aggregate effects
described in the first three columns of
Table 2. The fourth and fifth columns of
Table 2 then show how each of these
types of incentives is shaped and given
concrete institutional form by society-
community interactions (horizontal).
Generalized confidence can emerge when
the pervasive information problems, atten-
dant moral hazards, and market failures
of economies are attenuated. Communities
are low-cost ways of resolving these prob-
lems, by creating interpersonal trust, repu-
tational effects, and shared conventions. No
fully “societal” system—whether markets
or administered, centralized bureaucra-
cies—has ever succeeded in doing every-
thing that communities can do in this
regard. But communities can reduce gener-
alized confidence if they lead to rent
seeking, clannism, or corruption; hence, it
is best when they exist in a delicate and
dynamic relationship with the forces that
promote transparency, entry, and exit,
thereby limiting rent seeking and helping
to complete markets where communities
may stifle them. Generalized confidence,
in other words, requires both society and
community. Lundvall (2005) highlighted
precisely this kind of relationship in
analyzing the “Danish model” of economic
success. On the one hand, he noted that
much confidence comes from the “village
economy” basis of cooperation; but on the
other hand, he signaled the central impor-
tance of an educational system that teaches
personal responsibility and integrity, and
labor market institutions that expose indi-
viduals to competition through easy hiring
and firing. And he noted the extreme
contrasts between these features of the
Danish model and the continental corpo-
ratist and statist systems, as in France and
Germany.
The same is true of the achievement of
effective and acceptable distributional
arrangements. These arrangements can
neither be administered by a societal over-
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tion (Peck 1996; Christopherson 2002).
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seer,10 nor come about from the sponta-
neous interaction of individual agents.
For one thing, only some such agents
have the capacity to make their preferences
heard (Sen 2002). Communities can give
voice to agents whose claims would other-
wise go unheard by markets.11 Moreover,
group membership has the virtue of
diffusing a sense of “being in the same
boat,” and those who are in the boat can
contribute to a mutual sense that fairness
has been achieved (as well as injustice
and anger). In the former case, the accept-
ability of any distributional tradeoff is
enhanced. In addition, communities—even
in the most modern economies—often have
big roles in distributional matters. Families
in some economies carry out income redis-
tribution and smoothing, mobilize savings
at low interest rates, and share work. But
society is necessary as well if undesirable
forms of cronyism or enduring hierarchy
are to be avoided. Competition and polit-
ical interaction between groups counteract
corporatism and distributional holdups,
common standards of efficiency and fair-
ness can constrain certain group demands
and privileges, and intergroup mobility (the
possibility of exit) has a disciplining effect
on what groups do to obtain their piece of
the pie. It is their interaction that gener-
ates acceptable and efficient distribu-
tional arrangements.
As was noted earlier, any developmental
process requires ongoing adjustment of the
rules that govern its vital center: entre-
preneurship, labor markets, and invest-
ment. This adjustment, however, inevitably
generates the potential  for confl ict .
Effective problem solving and institutional
adaptation come about when it is difficult
for groups to practice excessive corporatism
and rent seeking and when problem-solving
bridges are built between the relevant
groups. On the one hand, the community-
based social bonds referred to earlier
provide groups with a certain degree of
security, allowing them to be “at the
table” so that their voices can be heard,
whether formally or in a more diffused
manner. On the other hand, societal forces
create limits to group power, so that the
position of groups is not so secure that other
coalitions are impossible. The participation
of many different groups prevents them
from practicing negative forms of exit
(resignation or winner-take-all) from the
problem-solving process. This participation
helps avoid the twin dangers of “bad”
stability in the form of interest-based but
nondevelopmentalist (rent seeking) coali-
tions, on the one hand, and extreme insta-
bility, on the other (Alesina, Ozler, Roubini,
and Swagel 1996). Thus, there is less danger
that intelligent ideas will be blocked out
because the principal interest groups have
less ability and incentives to bind them-
selves to rigid, exclusively self-serving posi-
tions. This makes institutional learning
more probable (Haggard 1990) and may
even allow ongoing revision of the most
basic institutional infrastructure, such as
legal principles, the system of political
power sharing, and other factors that influ-
ence political opportunity structures and
hence the possibility for competing ideas
to be heard (Evans 1995; Aghion, Alesina,
and Trebbi 2004).
Table 3 considers these three types of
incentives together, showing schematically
how different overall levels of society and
community in interaction wil l  shape
economies. A favorable interaction of
society and community allows the poten-
tially positive effects of each—respectively,
responsibility (agency) and autonomy
(voice, capacities) to emerge, while each
also acts as a check on the possible nega-
tive effects of the other were it to exist in
an environment that lacked the other. Thus,
stated in the most standard terms, the
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possible positive effect of community—
permitting actors to reduce transactions
costs and hence to enhance the autonomy
or scope of action of principals—is realized
when the potential moral hazards and
rent seeking of agents are held in check
by rules that enforce responsibility. The
potentially positive effects of society—such
as reducing the exercise of absolute power
by any individual or group and hence
encouraging responsibility through compe-
tition and innovation—are realized when
groups are present who can act as collec-
tive agents so as to give voice and autonomy
to principals who otherwise would not be
heard. Autonomy and responsibility are the
doubles of society and community, and each
depends on the checks and balances offered
by the other.
Changes in the Interaction of
Society and Community and
Their Effects on Economic
Performance
Most studies of institutions and social
capital have held that their effects on devel-
opment are the outcome of long-run
processes with deep structural roots. This is,
for example, the case with Putnam et al.’s
(1993) Making Democracy Work, in which
the civic involvement that is said to be at the
root of the economic dynamism of northern
Italian regions is traced back to the Middle
Ages. A glacial pace of change thus leaves
little room for maneuver (or, for that matter,
for hope) in those areas of the country that
have been unable to develop the “right” mix
of communitarian and societal institutions
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Society and Community in Interaction
Society Community
X
High
Low
Low
Responsibility without autonomy: individual agency
but an insufficient voice
• Dominance of arm’s-length transactions
• Moral hazards contained when information trans-
parent only
• Asymmetrical strength of individual agents
• Certain interests have no voice/no autonomy
(effort and reward markets are imperfect)
• Costly conflict resolution and confrontational
society
• Insufficient public goods
• Tendency toward inequality
Neither autonomy nor responsibility: chaos and the
law of the jungle (voice of the powerful, ubiqui-
tous agency problems)
• High costs for all types of transactions
• Generalized instability: weak societal rules, weak
local bonding
• High moral hazards, generalized opportunism,
low sanctions for defection and cheating
• Public goods destroyed, stolen, or appropriated
High
Autonomy with responsibility: a good balance of
voice and agency
• Costs for all kinds of transactions minimized
• Moral hazards contained for both transparent and
specific information
• Autonomy strong and participation high (strong
community reduces losses due to anonymity, frag-
mentation)
• Rent seeking contained through competition,
entry, and exit (a strong society modernizes
communities)
Autonomy without responsibility: collective voice,
but with agency problems
• High transactions costs for arm’s-length transac-
tions
• Prevalence of primitive, nonmodern communi-
ties
• Rent seeking widespread
• Individual voice subjugated to groups (insuffi-
cient competition and mobility)
• Insufficient generalized trust and confidence
• Skewed distribution of public goods
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over the past few centuries, as is the case
of the Mezzogiorno. Although the speed of
change of communitarian values takes place
at a faster rate in Putnam’s (2000) study of
American society, the pace is still slow,
extending over several decades. Various
schools of comparative institutionalism have
argued that founding moments in the remote
past (such as constitutions or legal systems)
are the roots of institutional form and
economic performance today (Glaeser and
Schleifer 2001). In contrast, we argue that
although some bonding and bridging
processes are shaped by long-term forces,
certain short- and medium-term changes are
also vital to economic performance.
Specifically, we contend that changes in the
relative strength of community and society
are constantly taking place; the sources of
change are both internal to societies and
communities and due to exogenous events;
directions of change are defined not by indi-
vidual elements, but by society and commu-
nity in interaction; starting points, as defined
by particular checks and balances between
societal and community forces, strongly
affect the potential speed of change and
modify the effect of the speed of change in
either of these two forces individually; and
economic outcomes are caused by the
process of interaction as much as by changes
in either of the two sources of change
taken separately.
Sources of Change in the Relative
Strengths of Community and Society:
A Typology
Changes in the forces of community and
society can have exogenous or endogenous
origins. Exogenous change is the outcome
of events that are independent of the internal
dynamics of the groups involved. Factors
such as war, natural disasters, globaliza-
tion, technological change, or the insertion
of new groups into preexisting contexts are
often outside the control of the inhabitants
of a territory and are likely to upset previous
problem-solving equilibria or arrangements.
Their effects can be favorable (new civic
contributions) or unfavorable (e.g., new
moral hazards or power imbalances).
Endogenous change, in contrast, stems from
developments within and between the
groups that inhabit a certain territory. The
internal evolution of groups often leads to
the alteration of, or a break with, previous
configurations of networks, power, and
compromise. Revolutions, the seizing of
power by a certain group or party with a new
political agenda, the implementation of
major changes in societal rules (such as the
major devolution of powers), or the emer-
gence of internal conflicts (ethnic, religious,
or political) may significantly alter the
balance of community and society forces.
Under certain circumstances (e.g., war
combined with revolution, as in the case of
Russia in 1917, or capital market integration
combined with a sudden economic collapse,
as in the case of Argentina in 2002), changes
in the community/society relationship may
be the combined outcome of both exoge-
nous and endogenous factors. To take again
the case of Russia, many scholars now
believe that the collapse of the Soviet system
left a societal void, and rapid liberalization
hence permitted preexisting communities
(former Soviet officials, notably) to emerge
and transform many sectors into clannish
oligopolies. In contrast, the Baltic republics
are widely considered—thanks partially to
ethnic cleavages and the exclusion of
Russians from power in state institutions
(Steen 1997)—to have constructed orderly
societal structures in the wake of the
Soviet collapse—and with them, market
rules—which successfully prevented
communities of nomenklatura from appro-
priating the process of economic transi-
tion. Other parts of eastern Europe,
however, are said to suffer from deficits of
communities that are capable of ensuring
innovation, entrepreneurship, and busi-
ness networks, so that even relatively orderly
societal transitions are not yet generating
any real economic takeoff (Steen 1997;
Geishecker and Haisken-DeNew 2004).
The alteration in the relative strength of
the forces of community and society gener-
ates what can be termed a process of
“institutional migration,” whose dimensions,
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scope, and outcome will depend on factors
such as the starting point (whether the
existing situation was optimal, suboptimal,
worst-case scenario), the relative weight of
change in each of the forces, and the conflict-
solving capacities of the preexisting situa-
tion. We now inventory the major possible
pathways of change.
Suppose that a territory n has a starting
point of community and society forces repre-
sented by point (c’, s’) in Figure 1. The x-
axis represents the strength of communi-
tarian forces, and the y-axis, that of societal
forces. In this case, both bridging and
bonding are weak; an example of the
worst-case scenario depicted in Tables 1 and
3. Suppose in addition that some exogenous
or endogenous event or process alters the
relative strength of these societal and
communitarian forces, which results in a
change of position of point n (Figure 1). The
direction of change in the starting point n
will be determined by the interplay of both
forces. Several scenarios can be envisaged:
1. If society is strengthened but not
community, the displacement will follow
vector 1, possibly leading to an oversupply
of society, featuring strong rules and an
emphasis on individual agency, but where
weak individuals will tend to have insuffi-
cient voice because of the weakness of
communities. Territory n would then
migrate from a worst-case scenario to a
better, though suboptimal, institutional situ-
ation, in which the stronger societal order
would reduce certain kinds of transactions
costs, raise confidence and the enforceability
of contracts, and generate powerful incen-
tives for certain kinds of human and phys-
ical capital investments. However, some of
the potential negative externalities of society,
including higher transactions costs that are
due to anonymity and moral hazards or
enhanced inequality, could emerge because
communities would not be strong enough to
check them. This is, in fact, the classic
dilemma of many rich countries and regions:
managing the tensions generated by the
long-term strengthening of societal order
with respect to the weaker agents in the
system. It is such a powerful tendency that
most such countries and regions now
deliberately assist groups of all sorts in orga-
nizing themselves and participating in
“governance” processes of various types,
hoping that these “civil society” groups will
be able to help smooth economic and
social processes in ways that official bureau-
cracies cannot.
2. If the outcome is an increase in both
the forces of society and community, but
with the former strengthening more than
the latter, institutional arrangements n will
migrate to a new steady state along vector
2 (Figure 1). Under this scenario, societal
and communitarian forces may initially
develop in parallel, but in the medium-run
societal forces come to prevail. This may
be as a result of inherent or ensuing weak-
nesses in the buildup of communities or
because of the greater development of the
institutions of the state after a certain point.
In this case, communities may nonetheless
be able to exert some checks on the poten-
tially negative externalities generated by soci-
etal forces taken alone, resulting in better
economic outcomes than under scenario (1).
3. If change in both forces is of equal
strength, the institutional arrangements in
territory n will move along vector 3, even-
tually resulting in something close to an
“optimal” institutional arrangement, char-
acterized by autonomy with responsibility
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Figure 1. The dynamics of the interaction
between community and society (1).
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and a good balance between voice and
agency (hence significantly reducing agency
problems). In the end, a new configuration
will emerge, featuring the optimal tradeoff
between transaction costs, rent seeking, and
moral hazards. It bears repeating that such
underlying strengths can take many different
concrete institutional forms.
4. If the increase in communitarian forces
is greater than those of society, the trajec-
tory of change will follow vector 4, leading
to a situation in which community prevails,
but moderate reinforcement of societal
arrangements succeeds in instilling some
checks on the potentially negative aspects of
communities. This was probably the situa-
tion of many small- and medium-sized cities
in the Third Italy in the post–World War
II period and underlay the success of these
cities’ small-firm industrial clusters. In recent
years, however, this situation has come under
strain from both internal forces (generational
succession in entrepreneurship) and external
forces (the globalization of competition).
5. Finally, an increase in community but
not society is described by vector 5. A
stronger community will generate greater
autonomy for actors to exercise a collective
voice and facilitate their joint action.
However, there is likely as well to be a strong
increase in agency problems, such as high
transaction costs, widespread rent seeking,
inequality, and lack of trust. The example of
post-Soviet Russia is the “poster child” of
this unfortunate trajectory.
This exercise in mapping possible path-
ways of change can be straightforwardly
extended to other starting points, as is
depicted in Figures 2a–2c. In particular,
Figure 2a highlights the potential determi-
nants of institutional arrangements in a terri-
tory that has, in the past, developed an effec-
tive set of checks and balances between a
strong society and strong communities.
Figures 2b and 2c present the potential
migration trajectories of territories with insti-
tutional arrangements initially characterized
by strong societal (Figure 2b) or communi-
tarian forces (Figure 2c). The former char-
acterizes the case of metropolitan Los
Angeles, a highly successful region that based
its dynamism during much of the
post–World War II era on the pillar of a
strong society with relatively weakly orga-
nized social and ethnic groups. Until the
1990s, Los Angeles behaved much like a
city-state in which powerful,  semi-
autonomous development bureaucracies
and a cohesive business class provided far-
sighted strategic planning. But community
and environmental resistance has grown
significantly in recent years. As groups have
become better organized, political institu-
tions have not kept up with them, leaving
what is widely thought to be an increasingly
conflictual situation in place, with growing
problems of governance and negative exter-
nalities (Erie 2004). In terms of Figure 2b,
metropolitan Los Angeles may have been
on vector 3 or 4 in recent years, but in a
highly uncertain and changing context. By
contrast, Taiwan—a successful developer—
started out at independence in a situation
of relatively strong underlying community
forces (a starting point represented by
Figure 2c). A societal (in this case, state)
apparatus had to be constructed, and it was
done in a way that community forces
(notably represented by the strong economy
of small- and medium-sized enterprises)
were able to participate and to interact
successfully with state bureaucrats, while
the latter were able to guide overall
economic policy (Wu 2005).
The Speed of Change
In addition to whether change is endoge-
nous or exogenous, the relationship between
community and society may be understood
according to the speed of change. Rapid
changes are the consequence of traumatic
events, such as war, revolution, natural
disaster, or sudden economic collapse,
disrupting the social forces underlying insti-
tutional arrangements in the short term.
Gradual changes are the result of processes
that operate over the medium to long term
so as to transform the balance of forces incre-
mentally; they can be set in motion by
processes such as globalization, technolog-
ical change, the evolution of social norms
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and lifestyles, or comprehensive reform of
public administration, or, for that matter,
virtually anything that has major impacts on
transactions costs within or between groups.
The speed is not determined solely by
each force (bonding or bridging), but by the
starting point defined by their joint inter-
actions. Figure 3 graphically represents these
two types of dynamics. Where the balance
between community and society starts out
optimal or close to optimal—and thus the
problem-solving capacity of a territory is
strong—or when they are close to the worst-
case scenario of Table 1, the speed of change
is likely to be low. By contrast, where the
starting point is far from the optimum, the
speed of change—irrespective of whether
the direction of change is positive or nega-
tive—is likely to be much greater.
Places with strong groups and strong soci-
eties will be characterized by institutional
arrangements with problem-solving mech-
anisms that help to resolve tensions and
agency problems, even in the face of
strong endogenous or exogenous pressures
to change. The presence of a high density of
cross-cutting and overlapping community
groups within a strong societal framework,
allowing for easy entry and exit, will not only
restrict moral hazards and principal-agent
problems and reduce transaction costs, but
also will reduce the possibility for endoge-
nous conflict and minimize the potentially
negative impact of exogenous forces. This is
the case of countries like the Netherlands,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden,
where deeply rooted societal and commu-
nity institutional arrangements have helped
to prevent serious internal conflict for long
periods (Lundvall 2002). When exogenous
challenges have emerged—such as the tran-
sition to a more globalized economy, with
the loss of manufacturing to cheaper areas
and the need to respecialize and adapt to
new business conditions—the institutional
arrangements have addressed its sources in
a pragmatic way that generates widely shared
adherence to the solutions that are adopted
(i.e., a partial reform of the welfare system
in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden
and the sweeping labor market reforms in
Denmark and the Netherlands). In turn,
confidence in and support for underlying
institutional arrangements has been
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Figure 2a, b, c. The dynamics of the interaction between community and society (2).
Figure 3. The speed of change in the
community/society relationship.
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preserved, which then facilitates further
problem solving.
At the time of this writing, change also
seems slow in a number of the big conti-
nental European economies, such as France,
Italy, and Germany, all of which have
suffered slow growth and high unemploy-
ment for a considerable time. Our frame-
work predicts that change will be slow in
these places, characterized by strong groups
and strong societies, even in the face of
strong problems, because they are—in the
long-run—strong and well institutionalized.
These cases allow us to bring out another
essential point: the time horizons of change.
Our framework addresses medium-term
processes. On this basis, it is probable that
France, Italy, and Germany will find solu-
tions that restore growth and generate
employment, but that this could take consid-
erable time. In each of these countries,
group forces have steadily strengthened over
the past two decades, and societal solu-
tions for reform have yet to command polit-
ical majorities, leading to severe
insider/outsider dynamics (e.g.,
employed/unemployed) (Esping-Andersen
and Regini 2000). Thus, they are all arguably
not at an optimum, but nor are they so far
from it that reform is unlikely. However, if
stability becomes blockage, the process of
institutional change has the potential to
gather pace and—beyond a certain
threshold—to generate a significant overall
transformation in a relatively short time. The
history of the Thatcher years in Britain can
be interpreted in the same light: a period
of standoff and accumulating problems,
followed by strong change in a fundamen-
tally stable developed country.
The United States is a case of a country
with strong societal and communitarian insti-
tutions, albeit in a different configuration
from those of typical continental European
countries. Putnam (2000) and other
“communitarian” theorists in the United
States have deplored what they see as a slow,
incremental but palpably increasing asym-
metry between traditional civic association
(declining) and strong corporate groups, as
well as the strengthening of market forces
to the detriment of group life (Etzioni 1996).
Accordingly, there is some evidence of
increased polarization and rejection of
compromise between the groups in different
political camps in the United States.12 Under
these circumstances, rent seeking and
corruption can spread, raising the cost of
transactions, creating a skewed distribution
of public goods. In an economy as vast as that
of the United States, the economic effects
are subtle. For example, many of the diffi-
culties of big “traditional” American firms
are in their “legacy” health care costs,
which are much higher than those of their
foreign competitors because of the absence
of a political compromise on health care
policy. On the other hand, the recent
American economic success, based signifi-
cantly on highly flexible labor and capital
markets, may be able to continue for a
considerable time if the associated social costs
can be externalized or otherwise avoided.
This, in turn, depends on the ways in which
societal frameworks and communities
interact over these issues. On the basis of the
amount of change that has thus far occurred
in the United States, it is impossible to
predict whether it will lead significant reform
movements (such as occurred in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in
the United States), to accumulating costs and
declining growth, or to other forms of
problem solving that sustain growth in novel
ways. These examples thus allow us to
observe that common distinctions between
“coordinated” European economies and
more “liberal” Anglo-Saxon economies13 do
not capture the underlying forces of coordi-
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to cooperate anymore; we have all the power
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www.alternet.org).
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stable than are liberal economies. This is not a
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nation, stability, and change that are at the
heart of our heuristic.
A slow pace of change is also common in
the polar opposite situation of weak institu-
tional arrangements. If societal forces are
primitive and group life is unstable and/or
clannish, weak institutional arrangements
resembling our worst-case scenario are likely
to prevail. It is extremely difficult to trans-
form them in the short and medium term.
Where societal institutions have largely
collapsed and community has been reduced
to its most primitive expressions—that is,
family and clan, even more than ethnicity—
the prevalence of individual over collective
interest, coupled with the absence of sanc-
tions for defection and cheating, rife oppor-
tunism and corruption, and weak local
bonding, is likely to make any improvement
in the quality of institutional arrangements
highly improbable. Such improvement is
impeded by pervasive moral hazards and high
transaction costs within and between groups
because of low confidence, which, in turn, is
due to the absence of enforceable rules and
sanctions and nothing that encourages
compromise. Positive change will be slow
and require massive and sustained efforts
under these circumstances, often with
substantial outside help. These conditions
characterize the present-day situations of
countries like the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Another
example of blockages to change is the
communitarian drift that has traditionally
prevailed in parts of the Italian South, taking
the form of mafias in such regions as Calabria
and Sicily (Bottazzi 1990; Trigilia 1992). It is
also found in poorer areas of Latin America,
such as northeast Brazil, where elite groups
hijack societal rules to their advantage and
simultaneously disorganize nonelite groups,
thus obstructing the emergence of checks
and balances (Storper, Lavinas, and Mercado
forthcoming). Similarly, under certain
circumstances, bottom-up devolutionary
processes can undermine societal rules and
reinforce specific interests that are not inter-
ested in positive change. The case of the
drafting of the 1988 Constitution in Brazil
is an example. The dominance of subnational
interests over the center during the drafting
process tilted the balance of power in favor
of regional groups, weakening the leverage
of the federal government, undermining its
legitimacy, and eventually exacerbating the
problems of debt and inequality (Rodríguez-
Pose and Gill 2004, 836–37).
The potential for rapid institutional
change—positive or negative—exists when
there is a severe imbalance between commu-
nity and society. Two such situations can be
identified. The first is when an already
uneven balance between community and
society is tilted in favor of the stronger of the
two forces. In some cases, exogenous shocks
or endogenous processes may weaken
some communities, groups, and associations,
leading to the reinforcement of other groups
or the society. The remaining groups may
then be able to hijack societal rules in a
winner-take-all way. The consequence of this
process will be a rise in noncooperative
games because of a fundamental shift in
power relations, and the likely outcome will
be a reinforcement of the asymmetrical
strength of individual agents, an increasingly
confrontational society, and growing
inequality.
Alternatively, institutional migration may
generate a society-only situation, with a
similar outcome as in the previous case. In
the years following the French Revolution,
for example, the “Le Chapellier” laws
banning groups (corporations) were passed,
creating a legal culture of dealing with social
and economic issues in a way that delegiti-
mated groups in favor of individuals, on
the one hand, and the state, on the other
hand (Rosenvallon 2004).14 Even though
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presented here. Underlying each of these visible
institutional forms may be more or less stable
configurations of societal and communitarian
forces, and this is precisely the reason to search
for more cross-cutting analytical categories.
14 This refers to the French notion of “culture
de généralité” (something equivalent to a pref-
erence for abstract, universal categories for
policies).
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groups were never widely destroyed in
France, over much of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, they were margin-
alized from the political scene and hence
little able to be involved in problem solving
in that country.
Rapid institutional change may also be
strongly positive. In this case, exogenous or
endogenous forces help correct a preexisting
imbalance between community and society.
This positive evolution may stem from
internal processes or be imposed by external
actors. “Bribing through incentives” is a
strategy that is often used by international
organizations to get communities to accept
stronger societal rules, with an aim to making
them more responsible, transparent, and
efficient. The World Bank, for instance, has,
in recent years, helped to promote decen-
tralization processes in many of the coun-
tries in which it has intervened, as a means
of reducing the power of certain local indi-
viduals, groups, or clans in states, thus
improving growth and service delivery and
minimizing corruption (Litvack, Ahmad, and
Bird 1998). Similarly—although for different
reasons—the strengthening of European
regional policy has de facto helped to
encourage decentralization in many
European Union countries, with the osten-
sibly paradoxical effect of strengthening soci-
etal rules at lower territorial scales. In other
circumstances, such a change may be set into
motion by endogenous processes that inter-
nally weaken rent seeking communities and
open up space for more effective societal
rules or allow other communities to become
more powerful and balance the situation.
Increasingly widespread autonomy and
hence more responsibility, through compe-
tition between groups, is the likely outcome.
External pressure from globalization
and technological and societal change, often
in combination with strong internal political
and economic crises, has played a key part
in the weakening of the stronghold that Latin
American elites have had on certain regions
of their countries, allowing a stronger civil
society and democracy to develop. In the
case of the São Paulo region of Brazil, the
process of economic restructuring triggered
by globalization—together with the advent
of democracy—has played a key role in the
adoption of more proactive attitudes and
policies by trade unions and industrial
groups, as well as by local and state govern-
ments (Rodríguez-Pose, Tomaney, and Klink
2001). In a similar vein, the improvement of
the society/community balance in certain
regions of the Italian Mezzogiorno, such as
Campania and Puglia, or in southern and
western Spain may be related to external
factors that are linked to the increased
integration of these areas in the European
Union, with its society-reinforcing effects,
as well as the Spanish transition from a
centralized dictatorship to a modern and
decentralized state (Aja 2001).
Thus, as the community and society come
into greater balance—in contrast to the
previously described situation of deteriora-
tion of the balance—the pace of change will
tend to decelerate as the balance between
both forces approaches the optimum (see
Table 1). It does so because as autonomous
but responsible participation in the economy
widens, there is less and less incentive for
rapid change, and the checks and balances
on any agents that would be tempted to try
and break up these arrangements are
stronger. Nonetheless, no institutional
system is perfect, and in the face of exoge-
nous changes in the basis of economic
success, even a relatively balanced system
may prefer compromises whose latent effects
are negative and hence give rise to pressures
for more radical reforms.
Finally, in situations of community/society
imbalances, the stronger of the two forces
may deteriorate. This migration from a
suboptimal to a worst-case scenario situa-
tion would be at first characterized by a rapid
speed of change, decelerating progres-
sively as a territory descends into a situation
of chaos, from which the potential of escape
is low. This is likely to be the trajectory of
present-day Iraq, where a relatively strong
society established by Saddam Hussein’s
regime—although tightly regimented,
built on fear, and characterized by the merci-
less repression of any community beyond
that of the ruling party, religion, and
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clan—was profoundly disrupted by mili-
tary intervention that swept away existing
institutional arrangements without success-
fully managing to build bridges across ethnic
and religious communities. A similar migra-
tion from suboptimal to worst-case scenario
was witnessed in post-Soviet Russia, as was
noted earlier. In both cases, collapse—
abetted in the Russian case by misguided
liberalization strategies—undermined the
bases of preexisting societal arrangements
and rules, without managing to generate
bridges between communities. This process
has contributed to the passage from what
were by any measure bad but relatively
stable economic (but not political) condi-
tions to unstable and relatively chaotic ones.
In this light, positive change is likely to be
slow and difficult, unless other types of
sustained positive forces for change are set
into motion.
Causal Processes: The Mutual
Transformation of Society and
Community
Proponents of institutionalist and compar-
ative economics would agree that starting
points for community or society matter
(Schleifer 2002). Yet there are important
differences between our approach and these
others. Comparative economics asks why
certain institutional forms come about under
different exogenous conditions, concluding
that the latter set up a wide variety of
bargaining or choice situations. Thus, for
example, the existence of different commu-
nities (regional, ethnic, or feudal) set up
bargaining games between such groups,
whose outcome is the construction of insti-
tutional forms of property rights and the type
of legal system. The rules or institutions that
emerge from this then have long-term
effects on economic development because
of the ways they affect individual incen-
tives and collective problem-solving. Much
of the recent work on constitutional frame-
works has found, for example, that soci-
eties with strongly contested and fragmented
power bases, such that successful bargaining
is impossible, may lead to attempts to
centralize power (successful in the French
case from 1500 to 1650). In other cases,
strong local power leads to “peaceful” decen-
tralized power sharing among central elites
and local or regional elites (Glaeser and
Schleifer 2001; Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi
2004). Legal systems reflect the issues that
were contested in the bargaining; thus,
centralization in France was accompanied
by a legal system that left little autonomy
to local interpretation, whereas in England
the common law system reflected the
more distributed power sharing of that
country. The resulting societal rules thus
reflect, to a certain extent, the ways in which
existing communities act upon their inter-
ests and are then bridged by new rules.
We argue that it is not only the starting
points, but also the strength and direction
of endogenous and exogenous forces for
change in both the community and society
spheres, that influence the potential evolu-
tion of each one of them. The paradox is that
comparative economics sees societal rules
as being generated almost entirely by
communities in interaction with each other.
Thus, societal institutions (as in public choice
theory as well) have no independent exis-
tence. In our view, however, societal insti-
tutions are “institutionalizing” because like
all institutions, they are materialized in the
form of networks of real actors. Such
networks legitimate themselves formally
through rules and material power and
sanctions and diffuse cognitive frameworks
across other groups of actors, which influ-
ence what these latter do and how they
define their interests and the possibilities of
acting upon them (Dobbin 2004). This
idea is shared by a number of other
nonmainstream schools of institutionalism,
such as varieties of capitalism, and certain
scholars of national business systems and
national innovation systems.
This view of institutions, whether societal
or communitarian, also involves a certain
number of additional, crucial differences
from the approaches that are now current
in standard theory. For example, that theory
relies in the end on restricted notions of
#2626—ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY—VOL. 82 NO. 1—82101-Rodríguez-Pose
20 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY JANUARY 2006
rational choice: a narrow definition of the
interests of the parties, bargaining situations
defined by transactions costs and prin-
cipal-agent dynamics, and how much rent
extraction the different parties can therefore
get away with. This is a problem because, of
course, groups are not individuals, and even
when principal-agent dynamics are taken
into account, their “action” in a wider context
of other groups, individuals, and societal
institutions is unlikely to conform to the
coherent-actor model used for individuals
(and which, in any case, is strongly ques-
tioned even for individuals by many theo-
rists) (Sen 2002).
Different limitations may be identified in
some of the other schools of institutionalism
(varieties of capitalism, business systems,
and innovation systems). These schools
emphasize the strong effects of history on
institutions and of institutions on actors.
Some of them are more rational choice
oriented than are others in describing what
individuals then do or what small groups or
informal groups do within these institutional
systems, but for the most part, the level of
individual choice is not at the center of the
theorizing exercise. When it is, it is often
invoked in an ad hoc way—“trust,” “cultures
of cooperation,” and other such devices are
assumed to operate for individuals at some
level of aggregation—but the result is that
they do not really theorize what individuals
do.
The theoretical framework put forth here
thus leads to different predictions about the
potential outcomes of processes of change
from those extant in the literature in two
principal respects. First, we hold that what
happens in the “other” form of collective
action can have big effects on the outcome
of a given direction of change in either the
society or community. For example, stronger
societal institutions—for whatever reason—
are likely to have different overall effects if
they occur in a context of weakening
communities from when they unfold in a
context of strengthening groups. In the
former, distributional inequalities will likely
widen because a smaller number of agents
will be organized in a way in which they
can use the rules effectively, and certain
kinds of transactions costs will rise. Whether
formal corruption declines or not, moreover,
will depend on the starting point for
society and community: initially weak soci-
etal institutions that strengthen in a context
of weakening communities tend to create
spaces for corruption as winner-take-all
opportunities arise; initially strong societal
institutions that strengthen in the same
context of weakening communities give rise
to competent state rule-enforcing elites who
prevent corruption. Thus, both mutual
starting points and respective directions of
change shape the overall direction of change.
Some of these outcomes would be seen as
perverse or impossible in comparative
economics, for the reasons discussed earlier.
The second major difference is the view
of the process itself. Standard theories
have richly modeled how groups can block
or twist societal rules, including both
economic and political losers as potential
obstacles to development, on the one
hand, and political and economic winners
whose interests do not coincide with optimal
development outcomes (Acemoglu and
Robinson 1999). But as we depict in Figures
1–3, this is an overly restricted view of how
groups may affect societal institutions and
economic development. In the same way
that groups can block or distort societal insti-
tutions, they can also construct and positively
shape them. This positive contribution
may be the (perhaps unintended) result of
their deliberate choices, in the sense that
the pursuit of their interests leads to config-
urations of competition, entry, and exit
that check tendencies toward rent seeking,
for example, and that lead them to support
societal rules in that sense. Or it may be
“fully unintentional,” as when groups
attempt to use societal rules and procedures
to advance their interests and, in the
course of doing so, reinforce the networks
of actors and cognitive frameworks of
those rules and procedures (Friedberg
1993). By the same token, societal institu-
tions (their actors at least) may construct
or destruct themselves, whether as a result
of deliberate choices or fully unintentional
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consequences. These are examples of the
ways in which institutions—whether societal
or communitarian—are made up of insti-
tutionalizing actors, not merely “bargaining”
or “choosing” actors, and in which institu-
tionalization is inherently interactive in
nature. This force is certainly present in the
nonmainstream institutionalist theories, but
it is not theorized in any consistent way, and,
in particular, there is no consistent notion
of countervailing forces in the organization
of collective action (e.g., minimizing trans-
actions costs but limiting rents), which we
are convinced is one of the principal
confirmed findings of standard microeco-
nomic institutionalist theory.
This view of the process introduces
another element that tends to be eliminated
from more standard approaches: uncertainty
along the way. Of course, much of the
literature on political processes uses
advanced game theory and introduces uncer-
tainty or opacity at different steps, so that
actors do not know what is being done
until the next round when action is complete
and they reevaluate (Grossman and
Helpman 2001; Persson and Tabellini 2002).
But if society and community are inter-
nally complex and in interaction, and if each
is composed of complex networks of actors
and involves such things as cognitive frame-
works, as well as all the standard features,
like principal-agent dynamics, information
costs, and transactions costs, then it can
readily be seen that the uncertainty involved
at each step is of a different order of magni-
tude from what is dealt with in most stan-
dard theory.
Even in a simplified account of the
interactions between society and commu-
nity, the changes under way in each will meet
up with institutionalizing counterforces (or
strategies) in the other, such that starting
points and directions of change in each are
still not sufficient to tell us exactly where
change will end up. The pathways that are
traced in Figures 1–3, however suggestive,
may be subject to “twisting” at intermediate
points in the process because of the uncer-
tainty that is introduced by society-commu-
nity interaction. Rather than the relatively
direct pathways we trace for heuristic
purposes, there may be S-shapes, J-shapes,
and even U-shapes.
This is not a call for abandoning theory
because the world is complex (we do not
abandon climate theory because the weather
is a complex process) but, rather, to intro-
duce additional refinements in the ways in
which we understand that process can affect
outcomes. Although introducing such refine-
ments is beyond the scope of this article,
there is a strong suggestion in our initial
conception of society-community relations
about how it could ultimately be done: the
process consists of intermediate steps in the
definition and redefinition of the checks and
balances that society and community define
for each other. These checks and balances
redefine the possibility sets for the actor
networks in society and community spheres
at each step in the process and allows a more
realistic view of process than merely the
recalculation of interests in the context of
limited information, followed by new rounds
of bargaining, as is the case in standard game
theory models. The evolving checks and
balances should be visible in rules, networks,
sanctions, power and cognitive frameworks
along the way.
Conclusion
The vast bulk of the literature on institu-
tions and social capital has been concerned
with the question of whether the presence
of strong communities or strong societies in
any given territory is good or bad for
economic performance. The emergence of
durably contrasting positions about the
respective merits and demerits of the domi-
nance of strong communities or strong soci-
eties has left relatively little room for theo-
retical progress. More important, it has left
almost no space for the analysis of real-world
circumstances of interaction between
communitarian and societal forces, even
though the circumstances under which one
of these forces would eliminate the other
entirely are almost impossible to imagine.
Such interactions include not only the theo-
retical “standard” case of mutual blockage
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between society and community, but many
in which the two complement each other
to generate institutional arrangements that
are beneficial for economic development.
The goal of this article has been to chart the
diversity of possible pathways of change in
these interactions and their effects on devel-
opment.
The advantage of this theoretical approach
is that it allows a consideration of a wide
variety of complex institutional contexts,
rather than merely emphasizing one prin-
cipal form of collective organization. Hence,
it cuts a middle ground between the extreme
parsimony of standard theory and the
descriptive empiricism of many heterodox
forms of institutionalism. We believe that
standard theory’s elegance is achieved at too
great a price in terms of behavioral realism
and institutional richness. Various alterna-
tive forms of institutionalism, by contrast,
risk becoming so complex and ad hoc that
they lose theoretical power. When applied
to problems of economic geography, they
tend to yield thickly descriptive geographies
of development that make it impossible to
generalize and falsify. The present approach
allows us to see the common forces that lie
beneath the many complex forms of insti-
tutions and does so in relation to their micro-
economic properties. It does so in a reason-
ably, but not excessively, parsimonious way
that can therefore yield general insights into
institutional change and its economic effects.
In this article, we have been able to
offer only the fundamentals of an approach
to analyzing changes in these foundations of
institutions. Future work requires better
specification of operational versions of
society and community as variables, in
relation to both institutional arrangements
and mesoeconomic and microeconomic
outcomes. With such variables, rigorous
comparative case studies could be carried
out, as well as quantitative comparative
analysis. Finally, additional progress on spec-
ifying and analyzing the intermediate steps
in processes of change, through measure-
ment of the unfolding checks and balances
that are defined by society and community
and their relationship to defining further
changes, would enable us to capture greater
complexity and diversity in ultimate
outcomes of change.
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